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Rethinking ―Murd erabilia‖:
H ow States Can Restrict Som e
Depictions of Crim e as They Restrict
Child Pornography
Joseph C. Mauro
Murderabilia refers to items whose commercial value stems
from their relation to a notorious crime or criminal. To protect
victims of crime from psychological harm, most states have passed
laws restricting the sale of murderabilia. Many of these laws have
been challenged on First Amendment grounds, and observers
consider them to be of questionable constitutionality.
I propose that the constitutional framework allowing states to
restrict child pornography can solve this problem. In New York v.
Ferber, the Supreme Court held that states may restrict child
pornography as speech, without regard to its First Amendment
value, because it is “intrinsically related” to crime in two ways—it
creates an economic incentive to commit child abuse (to produce
child pornography) and its circulation harms child victims by
forcing them to recall their experiences. The same rationale
applies to murderabilia, because it creates an economic incentive
to commit crime and its circulation harms crime victims.
Nevertheless, considering the range of speech that can be
considered murderabilia—from bags of dirt to abstract paintings—
laws that restrict murderabilia are more likely to run afoul of the
First Amendment than child pornography laws. Therefore,
Law Clerk, Hon. Sally D. Adkins, Court of Appeals of Maryland. I would like to
thank Leonard Niehoff for his guidance and comments. I would also like to thank the
IPLJ staff for their hard work editing this article. Finally, I would like to thank my
family and friends for their constant support.
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murderabilia laws must be strictly limited to the most harmful
crimes, the most vulnerable victims, and the least expressive types
of murderabilia. With properly limited laws, states should be free
to restrict murderabilia as they restrict child pornography under
Ferber.
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INTRODUCTION
A website called ―murderauction.com‖ sells items such as a
bag of dirt taken from the grave of James Byrd Jr.,1 the man who
was beaten, chained to the back of a truck, and dragged to his
death over the course of about three miles.2 The dirt is available
for $35.00.3 Other websites sell similar items—for example, a
letter belonging to Coral Eugene Watts, a man who confessed to
murdering thirteen women.4
Victims and their families sometimes protest these sales. The
mother of one of Watts‘ victims said, ―I had reached the point after
he was convicted and sentenced to life without parole that I
could . . . remember Elena without seeing his face. All that has
come back now.‖5 Sentiments like these help explain why forty
states have enacted laws restricting the sale of ―murderabilia‖–
items whose commercial value stems from their relation to a
notorious crime or criminal.6
1

Renée C. Lee, Byrd Murder Items Won‟t be Sold, Victim‟s Family Happy Web Site
Called Off Auction, HOUS. CHRON. Apr. 3, 2010, at B2.
2
Three Whites Indicted in Dragging Death of Black Man in Texas, CNN.COM (July 6,
1998, 11:07 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/US/9807/06/dragging.death.02/.
3
Lee, supra note 1, at B2.
4
Larry Schooler, Texas Law Would Prevent Sale of „Murderabilia‟, NPR.ORG (July
30, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12350079.
5
Id.
6
See Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O‘Brien, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can
New York‟s Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1075, 1075–76 (1991) (footnotes omitted). While there are a few definitions of this
relatively new term, I have chosen a broad definition of ―murderabilia‖ because it seems
more logical to group together all items that are commercially valuable for their
connection to crime than to attempt to break such items down into sub-categories
(especially given that the item‘s commercial value is the basis for most laws that attempt
to regulate such items). See also Suna Chang, Note and Comment, The Prodigal “Son”
Returns: An Assessment of Current “Son of Sam” Laws and the Reality of the Online
Murderabilia Marketplace, 31 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 430, 432 (2005) (defining
murderabilia as ―crime-related memorabilia‖); Ellen Hurley, Note, Overkill: An
Exaggerated Response to the Sale of Murderabilia, 42 IND. L. REV. 411, 412 (2009)
(defining murderabilia as ―items associated with notorious criminals that have found a
market on various Internet sites that cater to serious collectors and to those with a
macabre fascination for crime-related memorabilia‖); Hugo Kugiya, Crime Does Not
Pay—Unless
you
Sell
„Murderabilia‟,
TODAY
PEOPLE,
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/40073425 (last updated Nov. 9, 2010) (defining
murderabilia as ―personal items belonging to convicted serial killers that are sold by
private dealers‖). Thus, this paper uses the term ―murderabilia‖ to refer to anything that
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Although some favor banning murderabilia, the First
Amendment prohibits a simple ban.7 In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, the Supreme
Court held that states, under the First Amendment, could not
restrict or tax a convicted criminal‘s speech because of its content,
even if that content was a perverse interest in murder.8 Simon
struck down a New York statute forbidding convicted criminals
from profiting from descriptions of their crimes.9
In response to Simon, state legislatures began to address
murderabilia indirectly. For example, a handful of states passed
more narrowly crafted ―anti-profiting‖ laws, which seek to prevent
criminals from profiting from their crimes (as opposed to profiting
from publications about their crimes, a distinction that has proved
difficult to justify).10 Although some of these laws have been
upheld in state courts, others have come under constitutional
attack.11 As a result, murderabilia laws are narrowly enforced, and
sometimes struck down.12
has commercial value because of its connection to a notorious crime or criminal,
including the personal items that convicts sell from prison, the personal journals of
convicts like David Berkowitz (the ―Son of Sam‖), ―snuff films‖ that depict a murder on
screen, and original newspaper articles detailing a notorious crime. See discussion infra
Part III; see also David Berkowitz (former “Son of Sam”) Journal, ARISEANDSHINE.ORG,
http://www.ariseandshine.org/Journal.html (last updated Dec. 29, 2011). The breadth of
the definition, while internally consistent, makes it readily apparent that the category
cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be banned outright, and needs significant
doctrinal limits. See discussion infra Part III.
7
See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y.S. Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 123 (1991).
8
See id. at 116–18.
9
See id. at 109–10, 123. The statutory scheme placed all revenues in an escrow fund,
on which victims could make claims. Id. at 109–10.
10
See Hurley, supra note 6, at 417–23.
11
See id.
12
See Paul G. Cassel, Crime Shouldn‟t Pay: A Proposal to Create an Effective and
Constitutional Federal Anti-Profiting Statute, 19 FED. SENT‘G REP. 119, 120–21 (2006).
Professor—and Judge—Cassell details how statutes similar to New York‘s ―Son of Sam‖
Law have received a ―rocky reception‖ in the courts because they still target expression
under the First Amendment. Id. Many of these laws have been challenged and either held
unconstitutional or otherwise given limiting constructions to avoid running afoul of
Simon. See Hurley, supra note 6, at 417. For example, the Department of Justice has
instructed its lawyers not to use the federal murderabilia law, 18 U.S.C. § 3681, because
it might be unconstitutional. See id. Also, the California Supreme Court held its
murderabilia law to be unconstitutional because it was too similar to the law struck down
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United States Senator John Cornyn proposed a different
strategy for combating murderabilia. He introduced a bill that
would forbid prisoners from mailing anything with the intent that it
be put into commerce.13 Like anti-profiting laws, Cornyn‘s bill is
an attempt to combat murderabilia without running afoul of
Simon‘s prohibition on content-based regulation. Cornyn‘s bill,
however, does not address the constitutional concerns raised by
Simon. Instead, it simply makes the restriction so broad that it
appears not to be based on the content of the speech. Yet the
Supreme Court has held that speech restrictions based on the
speaker‘s identity are generally invalid.14 Moreover, Senator
Cornyn‘s bill would restrict the liberty of prisoners more than is
necessary to protect crime victims.15 Thus, even if the bill is
passed, it is unlikely to survive Supreme Court review.
I propose that a different doctrinal framework can solve this
problem. The Supreme Court has identified some categories of
speech for which content-based restrictions can be constitutional.16

in Simon. Keenan v. Superior Ct., 40 P.3d 718, 728 (Cal. 2002). The only difference was
that the California law applied only to convicted felons and the work had to be more than
a ―mere passing mention of a felony.‖ Id. The same was true in Nevada and
Massachusetts, where murderabilia laws were struck down under Simon. Id. at 421–23.
The Massachusetts law actually tried to address Simon‘s warning against
underinclusiveness by covering all contracts related to crime, but it was still held to be an
impermissible content-based regulation of speech because it required enforcers to
determine whether contracts for publication were ―substantially related to a crime.‖ Id. at
421 (citing In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 764 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Mass.
2002)). Finally, in Maryland and Washington, the highest courts of both states ducked
the question of constitutionality. Id. at 417–18, 420–21. These examples help confirm
the notion that murderabilia laws are generally suspect under the First Amendment.
There is also a strange holding in the Ninth Circuit, affirming a portion of an injunction
that forbids Ted Kaczynski, the ―Unabomber,‖ from publishing in his own name;
anything he publishes must be anonymous. See Samuel P. Nelson & Catherine
Prendergast, Murderabilia Inc.: Where the First Amendment Fails Academic Freedom,
108 S. ATLANTIC Q. 667, 682 (2009).
13
Hurley, supra note 6, at 411 (citing Stop the Sale of Murderabilia to Protect the
Dignity of Crime Victims Act of 2007, S. 1528, 110th Cong. (2007)).
14
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 883 (2010).
15
Thus, I agree with Hurley that Senator Cornyn‘s bill is ―overkill.‖ See generally
Hurley, supra note 6.
16
For a list of such categories, see Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When
Should the Dissemination of Ideas and Data be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
273 (2003).
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One such category is child pornography.17
Indeed, child
pornography is unique in that it receives no First Amendment
protection whatsoever.
Although laws that prohibit child
pornography are based on the content of the speech, they are
nonetheless constitutional because child pornography is
exceptionally harmful.18 As the Supreme Court reasoned in New
York v. Ferber, child pornography merits an exceptional rule
because it is ―intrinsically related‖ to crime in two ways: (1) it
encourages others to commit child abuse, and (2) it harms victims
by forcing them to relive their hurtful experiences.19 Cases
interpreting Ferber refined the rule.20
This article contends that Ferber should apply to murderabilia.
The Court in United States v. Stevens, while rejecting an attempt to
apply Ferber outside of child pornography,21 suggested that child
pornography is not the only category of speech to which Ferber
can apply.22 Thus, I argue that Ferber should permit the regulation
of murderabilia, with significant limitations. Part I describes child
pornography laws under Ferber and its progeny. Part II describes
how Ferber should apply to murderabilia. Part III discusses three
limitations on the application of Ferber to murderabilia—namely,
which crimes are involved, what form the murderabilia takes, and
the need to avoid ad hoc balancing.

17

See id. at 287–335.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982).
19
See id. at 759 & n.10.
20
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 254 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
21
See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (striking down a law banning depictions of animal
cruelty).
22
See id. at 1586
Our decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as
establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of
speech outside the scope of the First Amendment. Maybe there are
some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but
have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our
case law. But if so, there is no evidence that ‗depictions of animal
cruelty‘ is among them. We need not foreclose the future recognition
of such additional categories to reject the Government‘s highly
manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.
Id.
18
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I. BACKGROUND: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS UNDER FERBER
AND ITS PROGENY
The First Amendment‘s prohibition on laws ―abridging the
freedom of speech‖23 requires courts, when faced with statutes that
restrict certain types of speech, to examine the speech in question
and determine whether it merits First Amendment protection.24
Often this calculus involves ―balancing‖ or ―weighing‖ the value
of the speech against the interests advanced by the statute.25
Occasionally, weighing is unnecessary because the category of
speech, properly cabined, may be banned outright.26
Ferber represents the latter type of case. It created a
categorical rule allowing states to ban child pornography.27 Ferber
held that child pornography is peculiar, under the First
Amendment, in that ―the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process
of case-by-case adjudication is required.‖28 Thus, although the
Court recognized the ―inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate
any form of expression,‖ it upheld New York‘s categorical ban on
child pornography.29

23

U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (quoting Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976)).
25
See Denver Area Educ. Telcoms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740–41 (1996)
(―The essence of [First Amendment] protection is that Congress may not regulate speech
except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we
have not elsewhere required. . . . Over the years, this Court has restated and refined these
basic First Amendment principles, adopting them more particularly to the balance of
competing interests and the special circumstances of each field of application.‖); see also,
e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011) (employment law
context); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 754 (2008) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
26–27 (1976)) (election law context); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)
(copyright context); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707–16 (2000) (protest and privacy
context); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371 (1969) (media context).
26
Brenner, supra note 16, at 273 (discussing categories of speech such as Child
pornography, criminal libel, criminal contempt, perjury, conspiracy, treason, espionage,
harassment, criminal solicitation, fraud, and aiding and abetting).
27
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 755 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)).
24
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Ferber distinguished child pornography from obscenity.30
Unlike obscenity, in child pornography cases the ―trier of fact need
not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the
average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be
done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue
need not be considered as a whole.‖31 Thus, legislatures appear to
have greater flexibility in crafting child pornography statutes than
obscenity statutes, because only the latter depend on the definition
of ―prurient interest‖ and the determination of community
standards.32
Subsequent cases have clarified Ferber‘s breadth and
limitations. Osborne v. Ohio held that states could prohibit the
private ―possession and viewing of child pornography.‖33 It also
held that mere nudity does not constitute child pornography; the
image must be ―lewd.‖34 United States v. Stevens and Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition placed two limits on the doctrine, holding
respectively that Ferber does not permit states to ban depictions of
animal cruelty or ―virtual‖ child pornography, in which no real
children appear.35 These cases also expanded upon the rationales
in Ferber, explaining in more depth why child pornography may
be banned without reference to its First Amendment value.36
These rationales, I will argue, allow states to regulate murderabilia
under Ferber.

30

See id. at 764.
Id. On the other hand, some argue that child pornography should fall under the
Supreme Court‘s obscenity doctrines. See, e.g., Scot A. Duvall, A Call for Obscenity Law
Reform, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 96 & n.137 (1992).
32
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 489 (1957).
33
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
34
Id. at 113–14.
35
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250–51 (2002).
36
See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586; Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250–51.
31
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II. ARGUMENT: UNDER FERBER, STATES MAY RESTRICT SOME
TYPES OF MURDERABILIA AS THEY RESTRICT CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
BECAUSE BOTH ARE ―INTRINSICALLY RELATED‖ TO CRIME
Although the child pornography at issue in Ferber was
unquestionably speech, it was unprotected by the First
Amendment, and could be regulated, because it was ―intrinsically
related‖ to crime.37 Child pornography has been the principal
example of completely unprotected speech.38 The Supreme Court,
however, in fashioning its jurisprudence regarding child
pornography, created two factors that indicate which other kinds of
speech could be regulated under Ferber. First, how speech is
made, not what it says, determines its intrinsic relationship to
crime.39 Second, the crime must be sufficiently harmful, which
can depend on two things: (1) whether the victims are especially
vulnerable, and (2) whether the harm is grave enough to remove or
reduce First Amendment protection.40 Applying these factors to
murderabilia, it appears that Ferber left room for states to restrict
certain depictions of crime just as they restrict child pornography.
A. How Speech is Made Determines its Intrinsic Relationship to
Crime
Speech is ―intrinsically related‖ to crime, for purposes of the
First Amendment, when the generation of the speech is
inextricably tied up with crime.41 As the Court explained in
Ashcroft, ―Ferber‟s judgment about child pornography was based
upon how it was made, not on what it communicated.‖42 In other
words, because child pornography cannot be generated without
sexually abusing children, it is ―intrinsically related‖ to that crime.
Ashcroft struck down a federal statute banning ―virtual‖ child
pornography.43 The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
37

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249 (citing Ferber‟s holding that legislatures may ban
―distribution and sale of child pornography, as well as its production, because these acts
[are] ‗intrinsically related‘ to the sexual abuse of children . . . .‖).
39
Id. at 250–51.
40
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (2010).
41
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249–51.
42
Id. at 250–51.
43
See generally id.
38
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attempted to ―extend the federal prohibition against child
pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict
minors but were produced without using any real children.‖44 In
striking down the statute, Ashcroft observed that Ferber ―relied on
virtual images . . . as an alternative and permissible means of
expression.‖45 By permitting virtual images, Ferber was able to
avoid content discrimination, because in Ferber there was not ―any
question . . . of censoring a particular literary theme or portrayal of
sexual activity. The First Amendment interest [in this case] is
limited to that of rendering the portrayal somewhat more ‗realistic‘
by utilizing or photographing children.‖46 Ashcroft, then, clarified
that the way in which speech is generated determines whether it is
―intrinsically related‖ to crime under Ferber.47
Crimes other than child sexual abuse logically fit into the
―intrinsically related‖ framework.48 Although Ashcroft may have
attempted to limit its holding by stating, ―where the speech is
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall
outside the protection of the First Amendment,‖49 the Court
cannot have intended to limit its holding so drastically. Indeed, the
Court has held that there are numerous categories of speech,
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, that do not receive
First Amendment protection in certain circumstances—criminal
solicitation and conspiracy, to name just two.50

44

Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 239 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–56 (1998)).
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982)).
46
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763 (quoting People v. Ferber, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978)).
47
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250–51. It probably goes without saying that virtual
murders, like virtual child pornography, should remain constitutionally protected.
Murder and other heinous crimes are omnipresent in popular movies, television shows,
books, video games, and other forms of expression. See, e.g., CORMAC MCCARTHY, NO
COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN (2005); SE7EN (New Line Cinema 1995); Dexter (Showtime
Networks 2006); GRAND THEFT AUTO (BMG Interactive 1997); EMINEM, RECOVERY
(Aftermath Records 2010).
48
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
49
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764–65).
50
See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1999). And textually, the
statement in Ashcroft would seem to allow the restriction of speech ―intrinsically related‖
to the sexual abuse of adults.
45
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Moreover, there is no principled reason why Ferber should be
limited to child pornography. Is a victim of sexual abuse harmed
significantly more than a victim of attempted murder when she
recalls her terrifying experience? Is she harmed more than the
family members of a murder victim? Does it make sense for the
First Amendment to leave unprotected a video of a naked child—
harmful as it may be—yet protect a ―snuff film‖ in which an adult
victim is raped and brutally murdered on tape?51 I believe it is
impossible to objectively weigh the harm suffered by these
victims, which is why I argue that the First Amendment should not
arbitrarily draw the line at child pornography while protecting
snuff films and rape videos—especially considering that they lack
any ―serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.‖52
In Ashcroft, the Court suggested that what is unique about child
pornography is not only that children are sexually abused, but also
that crime is recorded and victims are created.53 Citing Ferber, the
Court reasoned that ―virtual‖ child pornography is different from
real child pornography because it ―records no crime and creates no
victims by its production.‖54 Recording crime and creating
victims, therefore, are important parts of the intrinsic relationship
between crime and speech that allows the latter to be regulated.

51
A bill was introduced in the California legislature in 2000 that would have
prohibited crush videos of animals and human beings. B. 1853, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999–
2000). A First Amendment public outcry stemmed from the ACLU based on the human
part of the bill. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN‘S LIVES, MEN‘S LAWS 97
(2005).
Instructively, the joint crush/snuff bill had a consent provision only
for people. Welcome to humanity: While animals presumably either
cannot or are presumed not to consent to their videotaped murder,
human beings could have consented to their own intentional and
malicious killing if done to make a movie, and the movie would be
legal. Even that was not enough to satisfy the avatars of freedom of
speech. One wonders anew if human rights are always better than
animal rights.
Id.
52
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (quoting Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
53
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).
54
Id. at 250.
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This rationale can apply to crimes other than child pornography.55
I will now turn to two kinds of intrinsic relationships identified by
the Court.
B. Two Ways in which Speech is “Intrinsically Related” to Crime
Two rationales support extending Ferber‘s framework to some
non-pornographic speech. First, Ferber and Ashcroft relied
heavily on the argument that the circulation of child pornography
continued to harm the victims.56 Second, Ferber reasoned that
child pornography was ―intrinsically related‖ to crime because its
consumption created an economic incentive to continue abusing
children.57 As I will attempt to show, these two rationales invite
the extension of Ferber-type regulation to depictions of other
crimes.58
1. The Circulation of Speech Continues to Harm Victims
Child pornography may be restricted because its circulation
continues to harm the victims of child sexual abuse. Ashcroft
55

See id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759). ―Under either rationale, the speech ha[s] . .
. a proximate link to the crime from which it came.‖ Id.
56
See id. at 249; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
57
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
58
Furthermore, Ashcroft implied that either of these rationales is sufficient, on its own,
to create the intrinsic relationship necessary to remove First Amendment protection.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–51 (2002) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at
764–65). Ferber briefly mentioned a third rationale supporting the outright ban on
distribution, but it did not elaborate on it, and in any case it would prove too much. See
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. The Court noted that because the state would eliminate all child
pornography if it could fully enforce its child abuse laws, it had the right to completely
eliminate child pornography through other means. Id. at 762, 762 n.14 (citing Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm‘n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (―Any
First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the
regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the
restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.‖).
While this argument may have prima facie appeal, it proves too much. If
legislatures could ban all speech predicated on an illegal act, nobody could learn that a
crime had been committed, because nobody could talk about it—because there would be
nothing to talk about ―but for‖ the commission of the crime. In my opinion, therefore,
the other two rationales—continued harm to the victim and motivation for the continued
commission of crime—must support the doctrine alone. Those crimes can stray into First
Amendment territory and must be appropriately limited. See discussion infra Part III.
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reasoned that, ―as a permanent record of a child‘s abuse, the
continued circulation itself would harm the child who had
participated.‖59 The same would appear to be true of recordings of
other crimes that cause similar kinds of harm to victims. While it
may be debated which crimes, when recorded and memorialized,
cause continued harm, certainly some do. The severe and longlasting psychological effect of violent crime on victims is well
documented.60
Relatives and friends of victims suffer psychological harm as
well. For example, a study of family members of murder victims
found that twenty-five percent developed full-blown posttraumatic
stress disorder (―PTSD‖), fifty percent exhibited some symptoms
of PTSD, and twenty-two percent continued suffering some
symptoms of PTSD a full decade after the murder.61 Indeed, ―the
emotional and psychological distress suffered by the relatives of
murder victims in many ways resembles that of rape victims,
combat veterans, and prisoners who have been tortured.‖62
Additionally, as documented by M. Regina Asaro and Paul T.
Clements, ―[m]urder has a serious immediate and obvious, as well
as long-term and subtle impact on the stability, development,
communication patterns and role performance of surviving
[family] members.‖63 Accordingly, this paper treats the family
members of murder victims as victims themselves, subject to the
risk of continued harm from depictions of their victimization.64
59

Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).
See, e.g., NAT‘L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (2002),
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentID=32364;
NAT‘L ORG. FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, Psychological Trauma of Crime Victimization
(2001), http://www.trynova.org/victiminfo/readings/PsychologicalTraumaofCrime.pdf.
61
M. Regina Asaro & Paul T. Clements, Homicide Bereavement: A Family Affair:
Impact of Murder on the Family, 1 J. FORENSIC NURSING 101, 101–05 (2005).
62
Eric Schlosser, A Grief Like No Other, 280 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 37, 37–76
(1997), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97sep/grief.htm.
63
Id. at 51 (citing a study by Dean G. Kilpatrick, the director of the National Crime
Victims Research and Treatment Center, at the Medical University of South Carolina).
64
Who counts as a ―family member‖ is beyond the scope of this paper, but research
suggests that nearly every murder victim has some persons related closely enough to be
psychologically harmed. As noted by Asaro and Clements, when dealing with murder
victims,
traditional definitions of family are insufficient. In terms of the
reactions that may occur in the aftermath of a murder, those in a
60
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Osborne reasoned that because the circulation of child
pornography continues to harm victims, it is important to regulate
its production, sale, and possession.65 The Court explained that
―the materials produced by child pornographers permanently
record the victim‘s abuse. The pornography‘s continued existence
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children
in years to come. The State‘s ban on possession and viewing
encourages the possessors of these materials to destroy them.‖66 If
other crimes, when depicted and circulated, cause continuing harm
to victims, then similar restrictions should apply to depictions of
those crimes. Thus, to combat continued harm to victims, states
should be able to regulate, to some extent, the production, sale, and
possession of speech that is ―intrinsically related‖ to those
crimes.67
Indeed, regulating possession could do more to protect victims
than existing murderabilia laws or anti-profiting laws, because it
might prevent the government, in some circumstances, from
circulating harmful speech for its own benefit. For instance, the
South Atlantic Quarterly documented a government-sponsored
exhibit in Washington, D.C., devoted to the murders of Ted
Kaczynski, the ―Unabomber.‖68 Among the potentially disturbing

relationship with the victim may experience the loss to the degree to
which they were emotionally attached. It is therefore important to
explore how survivors define themselves, in terms of family or
nonfamily, avoiding judgment about whether they are, in fact, family
in a legal sense. This more inclusive view takes into account those
individuals who were, for example, engaged to the victim, a
common-law spouse, or a child ‗taken in‘ by a family in light of
geographic, emotional or physical nonavailability of the
parents/primary caretakers (Clements & Burgess, 2002). It also
includes those who were bound to the victim in a less traditional
manner, such as same-sex relationships, children who perceived the
victim to be closer to them emotionally than an actual parent or
sibling, and grandparents who had custodial care of a child who was
murdered.
Asaro & Clements, supra note 61, at 3. See below, infra Part III.B for a discussion of
which crimes, in which circumstances, could fall under Ferber‘s rationale.
65
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110–11 (1990).
66
Id. at 111.
67
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110–11.
68
See Nelson & Prendergast, supra note 12, at 678–79.
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parts of the exhibit was ―an interactive display including the names
and, in many cases, photos of all of Kaczynski‘s victims. Visitors
could use a touch screen to select any of the Unabomber‘s victims
to learn more about the injuries each one sustained.‖69 It is not
difficult to imagine how such a display could humiliate victims and
their families by causing them to recall their painful memories, just
as the mother of Coral Eugene Watts‘ victim was forced to recall
her daughter‘s death when Watts‘ letter was sold online.70 In these
circumstances, circulating speech arguably harms the victims just
as child pornography harms adults who know that thousands of
people—or even one person—might be observing the sexual abuse
they suffered as children.
The Kaczynski display highlights an issue that could arise if
murderabilia were regulated under Ferber—namely, whether the
victims, in whose interest the speech is suppressed, should have the
ability to free it from regulation. Such a rule might make sense
from the standpoint of addressing continued harm to victims, but it
does not make sense in light of Ferber‘s second rationale, that
possessing and circulating child pornography creates an incentive
for others to commit crime.
2. Eliminating the Motive to Commit the Same Crime
Ashcroft and Ferber reasoned that child pornography may be
restricted because it creates an incentive for pornographers to
abuse children. Ferber found this rationale implicit in the maxim
of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.71: ―It rarely has been
suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press
extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.‖72 The Ferber
Court reasoned that, as with the speech in Giboney (illegal
69

Id. at 678.
See Larry Schooler, supra note 4. On the other hand, perhaps governmental speech
and educational displays should not be subject to regulation under Ferber, considering
that they have different and perhaps more valuable purposes than the artifacts traded on
murderauction.com. I will deal with the task of distinguishing between different forms of
murderabilia later in this paper.
71
336 U.S. 490 (1949).
72
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 & n.14 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
70
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picketing), child pornography is ―an integral part‖ of criminal
behavior because ―[t]he advertising and selling of child
pornography provide an economic motive for . . . the production of
such materials.‖73 Therefore, as with illegal picketing, states can
restrict images of child pornography without violating the First
Amendment. Ashcroft reiterated this rationale, holding that
―[b]ecause the traffic in child pornography was an economic
motive for its production, the State had an interest in closing the
distribution network.‖74
It is also important to regulate possession in order to remove
the economic incentive to commit crime.75 Osborne upheld Ohio‘s
restriction on the possession of child pornography, agreeing with
the State that, ―since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of
the child pornography market has been driven underground; as a
result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child
pornography problem by only attacking production and
distribution.‖76
Depictions of crime can also create non-economic incentives to
commit crime. For example, the mass murderer at Virginia Tech
stated that he had been inspired by the high school shooters in
Columbine, Colorado,77 whose crimes had been broadcast
throughout the country.78 Thus, publicity can be a powerful
motivating force to commit crime. Indeed, right before the
Virginia Tech shooter committed the murders, he mailed a
73

Id. at 761–62 (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at
760); see also Ferber, 454 U.S. at 777–78 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―The character of the
State‘s interest in protecting children from sexual abuse justifies the imposition of
criminal sanctions against those who profit, directly or indirectly, from the promotion of
such films.‖).
75
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249.
76
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1990).
77
Howard Berkes, Barbara Bradley Hagerty, & Jennifer Ludden, NBC Defends
Release of Va. Tech Gunman Video, NPR.ORG (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=9604204.
78
See, e.g., DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE (2009); ELEPHANT (Fine Line Features 2003);
BANG BANG YOU‘RE DEAD (Paramount Pictures 2002); BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE
(United Artists 2002); Law & Order: School Daze (NBC television broadcast May 16,
2001); Columbine Killers Planned to Kill 500, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 1999, 3:00 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/329303.stm.
74
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―multimedia manifesto‖ to NBC that contained pictures and videos
of himself and his weapons, and referenced his plans for mass
murder.79 In light of these events, it is not difficult to understand
why Ferber concluded that depictions of crime can create
incentives to commit more crime.80 The story of the Virginia Tech
shooter provides a clear example of how depictions of crime can
inspire copycat criminals seeking fame, a mouthpiece, or both.81
Nevertheless, Justice Alito has suggested that Ferber‘s
motivational rationale should be interpreted narrowly. Dissenting
in Stevens, he contended that the key to Ferber was that the
―underlying crimes could not be effectively combated without
targeting the distribution of child pornography,‖ which is a narrow
description of the motivational rationale—indeed, it does not
reference motive at all.82 Alito‘s version of the test likely would
not apply much outside of child pornography, because most crimes
can be ―effectively combated‖ without regulating depictions of
them (although the Virginia Tech shooting might be an
exception).83 Even so, Alito argues that the ―crush videos‖
(stomping on animals) at issue in Stevens had a sufficient
motivational nexus:
[T]he criminal acts shown in crush videos cannot be
prevented without targeting the conduct prohibited
by § 48—the creation, sale, and possession for sale
of depictions of animal torture with the intention of
realizing a commercial profit. . . . Faced with this

79

See Berkes, supra note 78.
See infra Part III.B for a discussion of how one could determine which crimes are
harmful enough to warrant regulation under Ferber.
81
Moreover, the maxim from Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949), which Ferber used to support its rationale, is by no means limited to purely
economic motivations—it extends to non-economic motivations as well. See New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982). On the other hand, these are exceptional
examples, and the motivational rationale will of course not be as strong for every crime
or every type of murderabilia. Thus, this is an important factor to keep in mind when
judging which crimes and which kinds of murderabilia could fall under Ferber.
82
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1599 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).
83
See id.
80
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evidence, Congress reasonably chose to target the
lucrative crush video market.84
Perhaps, then, Alito does not conceive of the motivational rationale
as narrowly as he claims.
In any event, the Ferber majority described the motivational
rationale differently. Regulating speech need not be an integral
part of regulating the crime itself; it need only be an integral part
of regulating material that cannot be produced without committing
the crime.85 Ferber reasoned that ―the distribution network for
child pornography must be closed if the production of material
which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be
effectively controlled.‖86 Thus, Ferber suggests that closing the
distribution network is necessary to combat the creation and
circulation of material related to crime, not the crime itself.87
This statement leaves open the possibility that Ferber applies
to depictions of other crimes. While the logic is somewhat circular
(of course regulating speech is necessary to regulate speech), this
formulation of the motivational rationale comports with the
continued harm to victims rationale, and shows that the two
rationales work in tandem.88 Moreover, Ferber clarifies that
speech cannot be regulated unless it ―requires‖ the commission of
crime. This limitation ensures that the rule deals with actual
crimes, just not as directly as Justice Alito might have wanted.
The Court has consistently deferred to legislatures to determine
which kinds of depictions incentivize crime strongly enough to be
considered ―an integral part‖ of such crime.89 Regarding whether a
motivational nexus existed, Ferber held that it was sufficient that
―[t]hirty-five States and Congress have concluded that restraints on
the distribution of pornographic materials are required in order to
effectively combat the problem, and there is a body of literature

84

Id.
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62 (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498).
86
Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
87
See id. at 760.
88
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–50 (2002) (citing Ferber, 458
U.S. at 759–60).
89
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62.
85
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and testimony to support these legislative conclusions.‖90
Osborne, too, deferred to legislatures in this regard: ―It is also
surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the
production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess
and view the product,‖ in addition to those who produce and
market it.91 If deference to legislatures is the appropriate way for
courts to determine whether the motivational nexus exists, then the
fact that approximately forty states and Congress have enacted
murderabilia laws suggests that Ferber-type restrictions would be
constitutional in this area.
III. LIMITING THE EXTENSION OF FERBER
While it appears that one could constitutionally extend
Ferber‘s framework to the depiction of other crimes, the
framework must still be adequately limited, as with any doctrine
permitting the regulation of speech, so as not to eviscerate the First
Amendment. Stevens clarified that any extension of Ferber must
be properly cabined. The Court struck down a statute prohibiting
depictions of animal cruelty because ―‗a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute‘s
plainly legitimate sweep.‘‖92 Ferber itself, however, held that the
tailoring need not be 100% precise:
While the reach of the statute is directed at the hard
core of child pornography, the Court of Appeals
was understandably concerned that some protected
expression, ranging from medical textbooks to
pictorials in the National Geographic would fall
prey to the statute. How often, if ever, it may be
necessary to employ children to engage in conduct
clearly within the reach of [the statute] in order to
produce educational, medical, or artistic works
90

Id. at 760.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109, 139 (1990). Also, it should not matter whether
the material is the original or a reproduction—both can constitute the same motivation for
continued crime. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765–66 (holding that states can ban
reproduction of child abuse that occurred and was recorded in a different state).
92
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
91
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cannot be known with certainty. Yet we seriously
doubt, and it has not been suggested, that these
arguably impermissible applications of the statute
amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials
within the statute‘s reach.93
Tracing the line between Stevens and Ferber, a statute is likely
not overbroad as long as its application to protected materials
constitutes a ―tiny fraction‖ of its reach.
Nevertheless, murderabilia is a broader category than child
pornography, and laws that restrict it must contain more significant
limits in order to avoid overbreadth. I believe that three limits,
stemming from Ferber and its progeny, should be sufficient to this
end: avoiding ad hoc balancing, cabining murderabilia laws to the
most heinous crimes, and distinguishing between different types of
murderabilia.
A. Avoiding Ad-Hoc Balancing
No extension of Ferber should create an ad-hoc balancing test.
Not only did Ferber disclaim any intent to create a balancing test
(it held that child pornography could be regulated regardless of its
expressive content), but Justice O‘Connor also explained, in her
concurring opinion, that a balancing test would be particularly
inappropriate in this area.94 She wrote: ―An exception for
depictions of serious social value . . . would actually increase
opportunities for the content-based censorship disfavored by the
First Amendment.‖95 In other words, a rule that allowed judges to
decide in each case whether a certain depiction is valuable enough
to merit protection would invite judges to use their own biases to
decide which instances of speech to protect. Justice O‘Connor‘s
argument is particularly cogent because she is often regarded as
favoring ad hoc balancing.96

93

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774–75 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
95
Id. at 775.
96
See generally, e.g., ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22227, PROPERTY
RIGHTS ―TAKINGS‖: JUSTICE O‘CONNOR‘S OPINIONS (2005) available at
http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RS22227.pdf.
94
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This is not to suggest that the value of speech is entirely
irrelevant under Ferber. The potential value of a category of
speech is relevant to whether it may be restricted consistent with
the First Amendment. For example, even if newspapers began to
print child pornography, they could not be outlawed as such; the
category of ―newspaper‖ is too broad, and too full of First
Amendment value, to justify such a ban. Thus, the value of speech
is relevant to drawing doctrinal lines around categories of speech,
some of which may be restricted without reference to the value of
each individual instance of speech. Child pornography—along
with criminal libel, criminal contempt, perjury, conspiracy,
treason, espionage, harassment, criminal solicitation, fraud, and
aiding and abetting—is one category of speech that may be
regulated without reference to how expressive each instance may
be.97 While courts must determine whether each case falls within
one of the categories, they do not consider the value of the instance
of speech in making the determination.98 Thus, courts need not
reinvent the doctrine each time it is applied.
B. To Which Crimes Should Ferber Apply?
1. The Crimes Must be Precisely Defined in Both the
Criminal Statute and the Murderabilia Statute
Although the Court has not specified which types of crimes are
sufficient for Ferber, it has clarified two principles. First, the
conduct must be criminal in the relevant jurisdiction.99 Second, the
murderabilia statute must define its underlying crimes precisely,
narrowly tailoring the restriction on speech to those crimes for
which publication causes the most harm.100
Murderabilia laws can apply only to speech that depicts actual
crimes. Ferber held that ―the conduct to be prohibited must be
adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or
authoritatively construed.‖101 This limitation is an obvious one,
97
98
99
100
101

See generally Brenner, supra note 16.
See id.
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579 (2010).
See id. at 1580–81.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
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but it is worth mentioning for two reasons. First, it prevents
legislatures from attempting to pass off a pure speech restriction as
a murderabilia law. Simple disapproval of a speaker‘s message or
manner of speaking will never justify a murderabilia law under
Ferber because the actions depicted must in fact be criminal.102
Second, the above language limits the doctrine to depictions of
―adequately defined‖ crimes.103 Thus, legislatures may not point
to a vague criminal law to support a murderabilia statute.
Furthermore, the murderabilia statute itself must be limited to
crimes for which the two parts of the Ferber doctrine apply—
namely, that the circulation of speech encourages people to commit
crime or causes additional harm to the victims.104 The Court
elaborated upon this rule in Stevens, which held that Ferber could
not be extended wholesale to depictions of animal cruelty because,
while the distribution of animal ―crush videos‖ may motivate
further acts of animal cruelty, there is no continued harm to the
animal victim.105
Stevens is an important case for those who seek to extend
Ferber beyond child pornography. At several points in the
opinion, the Court states that the doctrine can indeed be extended
to depictions of crimes other than child sexual abuse.106 For
example, the opinion states: ―We therefore need not and do not
decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other depictions
of extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional.‖107 If Ferber
were strictly limited to child pornography, the Court could simply
have held Ferber may not be extended to other crimes. The Court
did not do this, however.108 Rather, it explained that the statute
was overbroad because it banned speech that was clearly protected
by the First Amendment, in addition to speech that might not have
been:

102
103
104
105
106
107
108

See id. at 764–66.
Id. at 764.
See, e.g., id. at 761.
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010).
See id. at 1586, 1592.
Id. at 1592.
See id. at 1586.

MAURO.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/14/2012 5:46 PM

RETHINKING “MURDERABILIA”

345

[T]he Government makes no effort to defend the
constitutionality of § 48 as applied beyond crush
videos and depictions of animal fighting. It argues
that those particular depictions are intrinsically
related to criminal conduct . . . and that the ban on
such speech is narrowly tailored to reinforce
restrictions on the underlying conduct, prevent
additional crime arising from the depictions, or
safeguard public mores. But the Government
nowhere attempts to extend these arguments to
depictions of any other activities—depictions that
are presumptively protected by the First
Amendment but that remain subject to the criminal
sanctions of § 48. Nor does the Government
seriously
contest
that
the
presumptively
impermissible applications of § 48 (properly
construed) far outnumber any permissible ones.109
The fact that the Court mentions ―permissible‖ sanctions against
depictions of crimes other than child sexual abuse demonstrates
that Ferber is ripe for extension to other crimes.110
2. The Harm Must Be Sufficiently Grave
Ferber held that child pornography is exceptionally harmful.
Most crimes are not harmful enough that depictions of them may
be regulated without First Amendment protection.111 With respect
to child pornography, however,
the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake,
that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required. . . . ‗It is irrelevant to the child [who has
109

Id. at 1592.
Cf. id. at 1594 (Alito, J., dissenting) (―[T]he Court tacitly assumes for the sake of
argument that § 48 is valid as applied to these depictions [i.e., crush videos and
depictions of animal fighting] . . . .‖). The Court has also stated that pornography that is
merely degrading to women is not enough to merit the application of the Ferber doctrine,
which makes sense because the actions depicted are not necessarily criminal. See
generally Am. Booksellers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff‟d,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
111
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
110
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been abused] whether or not the material . . . has a
literary, artistic, political or social value.‘112
Although child pornography is exceptionally harmful, the
Court never intimated that it was unique in its ability to generate
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.113 As discussed
above, Stevens appears to have rejected such a notion.114 So,
which crimes should fall under Ferber?
Methodologically, I believe this question must be answered, to
the extent possible, by existing Supreme Court precedent. In this
regard, I disagree with Joseph Anclien, author of a recent article in
the Memphis Law Review suggesting that Stevens was wrongly
decided and that Ferber should have been extended to cover
depictions of animal cruelty.115 Anclien argues that Ferber should
extend beyond depictions of child abuse, and I agree with this, but
I disagree with his method for determining how far Ferber should
extend. Stevens, rather than being wrongly decided, actually helps
clarify Ferber‘s reach.116 In striking down the federal statute
outlawing depictions of animal cruelty, Stevens emphasized that it
restricted too many kinds of depictions, reaching well beyond the
―crush videos‖ and ―animal fighting movies‖ that constituted the
worst kind of harm.117
A more limited statute, however, might have been
constitutional. The Court stated that some of the statute‘s
restrictions may have been ―permissible,‖ referencing the animal
fighting and ―crush videos‖ emphasized by the government‘s
attorneys.118
Of course, the statute reached beyond such
depictions, outlawing speech ―presumptively protected by the First
112

Id. at 761 (quoting Memorandum from Assemblyman Lasher in Support of N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 2006); id. at 763–64.
113
See generally id.
114
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (―We therefore need not and do not decide whether a
statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty would be
constitutional.‖).
115
Joseph J. Anclien, Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal
Depictions, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). Anclien clerked for Judge Robert E. Cowen
on the Third Circuit who dissented in Stevens. Id. at 54 n.a1.
116
See generally id.
117
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
118

Id.
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Amendment.‖119 Yet if crush videos and animal fighting may have
been harmful enough to merit restriction under Ferber, then other
types of crimes may be harmful enough.
I submit, then, that murder is harmful enough. If the gruesome,
premeditated torture and killing of an animal might be harmful
enough to warrant an extension of Ferber, then the gruesome,
premeditated killing of a person should be as well.120 In this way, I
agree with Anclien that ―snuff films‖ are the most obvious
extension of Ferber.121 Similarly, certain types of violent
pornography, in which someone is tortured and abused on camera,
should also fall under Ferber. In fact, the contrast between an
animal dying in ―crush videos‖ and someone living in violent
pornography highlights a significant distinction.122 As Ferber
explained, the continued circulation of such violent pornography is
certainly more harmful to a victim who is still alive than it is to a
victim who is dead, notwithstanding the harm to family
members.123
I disagree with Anclien, however, regarding ―films in which
perpetrators assault strangers while the act is recorded.‖124 Snuff
films and violent pornography are definable categories of speech
that satisfy both of Ferber‘s rationales. Films recording stranger
assaults, on the other hand, do not lend themselves to such tight
definition. If Ferber created an ad hoc balancing test, then perhaps
particularly gruesome stranger assaults could be restricted on a
case-by-case basis. As discussed above, however, the First
Amendment in general, and Ferber in particular, do not allow for
ad hoc balancing—only tightly cabined categories of speech may
be restricted under Ferber, with courts considering only whether
an instance of speech falls within a particular category. 125 As a
category of speech, stranger assault videos are not harmful enough
119
120

Id.

Cf. Brief for Amicus Curiae Northwest Animal Rights Network in Support of
Petitioner at 5, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769).
121
Anclien, supra note 116, at 49.
122
See Anclien, supra note 116, at 9.
123
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). This conclusion is in agreement
with Anclien, supra note 116, at 52, but under a different analysis.
124
Anclien, supra note 116, at 52.
125
See supra Part III.A.
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that ―the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-bycase adjudication is required.‖126 Accordingly, while stranger
assaults do generate harm, that harm does not always rise to the
level of crush videos, snuff films, or violent pornography.
Thus, at this point, I would allow the regulation of murderabilia
only when it is related to murder and torture, with the possibility of
gruesome assault as a properly cabined category. Such a limitation
respects the notion that Ferber is indeed exceptional and that the
First Amendment cannot bow to anything but the most serious
harm.127 I would not suggest that this should forever be the limit,
however, because cases may arise to challenge the bounds of any
doctrine.
Thus, perhaps my most important point is
methodological; that any extension or contraction of Ferber must
be consistent with precedent and based upon the severity of harm
that the crime typically causes, not the value, high or low, of the
instance of speech involved.128
3. Especially Vulnerable Victims
Ferber also suggests that a crime must create a certain kind of
victim to be subject to regulation. In upholding the ban on child
pornography, the Court compared the statute to ―legislation aimed
at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even
when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of
constitutionally protected rights.‖129 For example, the Court cited
Prince v. Massachusetts, which held that states can prevent
children from distributing literature in the streets even though such
126

See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64; Anclien, supra note 115, at 52–53 (explaining that
stranger assault videos have varying degrees of severity). Thus, I wonder if Anclien
would propose ―case-by-case adjudication‖ in this area, notwithstanding his recitation of
the categorical nature of the Ferber doctrine. See Anclien, supra note 116, at 12 (quoting
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64).
127
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99
MICH. L. REV. 281, 288 (2000) (arguing that laws should not impinge upon the First
Amendment unless the harms sought to be avoided are ―serious one[s], with some
gravity‖).
128
However, exactly which forms of murderabilia might fall under Ferber must be
determined with reference to the potential First Amendment value of that category of
murderabilia. See discussion infra Part III.C.
129
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747, 757 (1982).
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activity falls squarely within the First Amendment.130 Ferber also
cited Ginsburg v. New York, which held that states can protect
children from non-obscene literature even though accessing such
literature is a First Amendment right for adults.131 These activities
could be circumscribed because the victims were especially
vulnerable.
While Prince and Ginsburg suggest that children are a unique
class of victim, they need not imply that children are the only
victims for whom speech ―intrinsically related‖ to crime may be
restricted. Again, Stevens refuted such a notion when it implied
that ―crush videos‖ could be restricted in the interest of victimized
animals.132 In Prince and Ferber, the victims were vulnerable
because they were children. But the altercations in the street that
concerned the Court in Prince are not dangerous for children
alone. They are dangerous for any particularly vulnerable group—
for example, the developmentally disabled.
The same would seem to be true of other kinds of exposure that
are especially harmful for certain groups—for example,
murderabilia for crime victims. In murderabilia cases, some
victims are just as vulnerable as children, or perhaps more so,
because they are victims of crimes, the depiction of which can
harm them just as much as altercations in the street or offensive
non-obscene material can harm a child. Thus, following Prince
and Ginsburg, a given article of murderabilia should be suppressed
under Ferber only when the crime underlying it creates especially
vulnerable victims.
This rationale again supports the notion that violent
pornography should fall under Ferber. It would be difficult to
argue that the continued circulation of a depiction of someone
being raped or tortured is less harmful to the victim than the
continued circulation of the least harmful example of child
pornography. This rationale also supports the notion that some
stranger assault films might fall under Ferber in categories where

130
131
132

Id. at 757 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
Id. (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637–43 (1968)).
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010).
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the victims are especially vulnerable.133 For example, people who
have been victimized by multiple filmed assaults may be more
psychologically vulnerable to the circulation of the recordings,
thus justifying some regulation of the films.
A different calculus emerges with respect to murder victims,
however, because the primary victims are dead. Should snuff films
retain First Amendment protection because their continued
circulation harms only friends and family of the victim? One
could argue that murder victims‘ friends and family are especially
vulnerable in just the way that Ferber requires. As described
above, serious psychological harm results when a family member
is murdered.134
One presumes that such harm would be
exacerbated if depictions of the murder were widely published—
for example, if the spouse of a murder victim were forced to see
the slashed body of his or her spouse on billboards or television
advertisements for a book depicting the killing.135 On the other
hand, perhaps snuff films are so harmful that the motivational
nexus is strong enough by itself to justify regulation, leaving aside
the question of continued harm. Thus, I contend that just as child
pornography does not magically become legal when its child
subject dies, a snuff film should not be legal simply because its
victim is dead.
4. The Legislature Must Determine that the Speech Should be
Restricted
Another prerequisite to upholding the ban on child
pornography in Ferber was that the legislature had determined that
it was harmful enough to merit regulation.136 In this way, Ferber
declined to
second-guess this legislative judgment. . . . Suffice
it to say that virtually all of the States and the
United States have passed legislation proscribing
the production of or otherwise combating ―child
133

See Anclien, supra note 116, at 51–52.
See supra Part II.B.2.
135
See Gigi Stone, „Murderabilia‟ Sales Distress Victims‟ Families, ABC NEWS (Apr.
15, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/US/story?id=2999398.
136
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
134

MAURO.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

RETHINKING “MURDERABILIA”

2/14/2012 5:46 PM

351

pornography. The legislative judgment, as well as
the judgment found in the relevant literature, is that
the use of children as subjects of pornographic
materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional,
and mental health of the child. That judgment, we
think, easily passes muster under the First
Amendment.137
In other words, because state and federal legislatures had
determined that child pornography was harmful enough to warrant
an exception to the First Amendment, the Court declined to pass
judgment on that determination. Can the same be true of the
murderabilia laws passed by approximately forty states and the
federal government?138
While federalism and separation of powers must place some
limit on this kind of rationale, they also support it when properly
limited. On the one hand, ―[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,‖139 which
suggests that federal courts may not blindly defer to Congress or
state legislatures to determine the bounds of First Amendment
protection.
Furthermore, the scope of countermajoritarian
constitutional protections like free speech is wisely entrusted to the
judiciary, not the political branches where majority rules.140 On
the other hand, when it comes to evaluating complex empirical
questions, such as the difference between certain kinds of
psychological or physical harm, legislatures may be better
equipped than courts to investigate and provide answers. And
even when the question is not empirical, the Court has stated that
―evolving standards of decency‖ may be measured at least in part
by reference to the collective views of state and federal
legislatures.141 Thus, in the same way that Congress and state
legislatures are well-equipped to empirically investigate harm and

137

Id.
See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 764 N.E.2d 343, 347 n.4 (Mass.
2002); Ecker & O‘Brien, supra note 6, at 1075–76, n.6.
139
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
140
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1936).
141
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
138
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express evolving standards of decency (as well as duty-bound to
uphold the Constitution), courts are perhaps wise to consider
legislative judgments regarding which crimes are sufficiently
harmful to remove First Amendment protection from their
depictions. Approximately forty states decided that murderabilia,
in one form or another, can be sufficiently harmful to overcome
First Amendment protection.142 Which forms, however, remains
an important question.
C. Which Forms of Murderabilia Might Fall Under Ferber?
I have argued that the question of which crimes are covered by
Ferber must not depend on the value of individual instances of
speech. Ad hoc determinations of the value of certain instances of
speech are impossible to predict, give no notice to litigants or
speakers, and are subject to the whims of individual judges.
Moreover, Ferber did not base its rule on the ―low value‖ of the
speech it examined.
Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that Ferber would not
have been able to disregard the First Amendment value of child
pornography unless, in general, such value was low. In other
words, by holding that child pornography is so harmful that no
First Amendment interest can overcome it, the Court presumably
recognized that First Amendment interests would not be affected
as much as if, for example, newspaper publication were subjected
to a similar rule.
It is therefore not the value of any specific instance of speech
that bears on the Ferber analysis, but the likely potential value of
certain categories of speech. In other words, the value-blind
Ferber analysis cannot sweep away forms of speech that
commonly carry high-value expression, because such a rule would
impinge upon the interests that the First Amendment is meant to
protect. Thus, I disagree with Anclien that Ferber should not
―extend to any speech that forms an ‗essential part of any
exposition of ideas,‘‖143 for it must extend to child pornography in

142

See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 764 N.E.2d at 347 n.4.
Anclien, supra note 116, at 53 (emphasis added) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
143
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which the child recites the Declaration of Independence just as it
applies to any instance of child pornography. But Anclien is right
that the doctrine must not apply to those categories or forms of
speech that typically have the potential to touch the ―essential . . .
exposition of ideas.‖144 Only in this way can the doctrine be
cabined in a way that adequately protects First Amendment values.
Perhaps it is easy to identify some categories of murderabilia
that could never fall subject to Ferber because their value is in the
information they convey. For example, even if they depict heinous
crimes, memoirs, works of fiction, biographies, newspapers and
the like allow the public to learn about important topics in a way
that would be impossible if such stories were subject to regulation
under Ferber. The same would seem to be true of oral recordings
or taped interviews. Thus, just as the First Amendment would
never allow the government to outlaw a documentary about child
pornography simply because it describes child pornography, it
would also never allow the government to ban a documentary or
tell-all confession about a homicide. Simon, then, as it must,
remains untouched by my argument. And this is true even when
the most notorious murderers are interviewed and their notoriety
contributes to the popularity of the publication.
This analysis seems to suggest a sharp distinction between
visual and written depictions of crime, i.e., that Ferber can extend
to visual depictions of crime but not written ones. In general, I
might agree that this is a good description Ferber‘s bounds, but I
am not willing to say that all visual depictions may be banned. For
example, visual depictions of crimes that are not sufficiently
harmful to fall under Ferber cannot be banned—such as the videos
of animal cruelty protected in Stevens. Also, paintings by famous
killers have become one of the more popular forms of
murderabilia.145 Although victims object to selling such paintings,

144

Id. at 20–22 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72).
See, e.g., David Lohr, Murderabilia: Art or a New Form of Victimization?,
AOLNEWS.COM (Feb. 13, 2010, 4:33 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/02/
13/murderabilia-art-or-a-new-form-of-victimization/ (describing a painting by serial
killer Danny Rolling on sale for $2000); Sean Richard Sellers 12”x16” Painting Acrylic
on Canvas, SERIAL KILLERS INK.NET, http://serialkillersink.net/skistore/index.php?_a=
145
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the harm to victims seems less direct than where the depiction is a
photograph or film. Perhaps here, too, the harm is not weighty
enough to merit disregarding the expressive value of the category
of speech (not to mention the therapeutic value for those who may
be dealing with psychological and emotional issues).146 Indeed, it
would seem that a painting depicting a murderer‘s victim would
have to be protected under Simon. Perhaps it is the creative
element that separates such works from snuff films. Whatever the
reason, it must be true that people cannot be silenced simply
because they have been convicted of a crime, and for this reason
Senator Cornyn‘s proposed bill, which would prohibit prisoners
from mailing anything that is for sale, is too broad as well.147
But what is perhaps the most popular form of murderabilia—or
at least the form that has garnered the most attention of late—
involves no depiction at all.148 A number of websites sell or
auction items that are simply related to a notorious crime or
criminal, with no expressive modification whatsoever.149 In fact,
these items likely led to the development of the term
―murderabilia.‖150 Applying the analysis that I have enunciated to
this type of murderabilia might seem simple—its potential
expressive value as a category of speech is low, its harm to victims
is high (at least for significant crimes), and it is ―intrinsically

viewProd&productId=28 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (advertising a painting by satanic
ritualistic Sean Sellers, on sale for $1050).
146
See, e.g., Angie Holdsworth, Looming Budget Cuts Threaten Therapy Program for
Arizona‟s Mentally Ill, ABC15.COM (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news
/state/Looming-budget-cuts-threaten-therapy-program-for-Arizona‘s-mentally-ill
(describing art therapy); Stacy Jacobson, Psychiatric Patients Show Off Art Therapy
Pieces, WBOY.COM, http://66.118.80.206/story.cfm?func=viewstory&storyid=91266
(last updated Dec. 17, 2010, 7:16 PM).
147
See Hurley, supra note 6, at 416–17 (citing Stop the Sale of Murderabilia to Protect
the Dignity of Crime Victims Act of 2007, S. 1528, 110th Cong. (2007)). It seems
difficult to think of a written depiction of crime that could be banned after Simon, but I do
not think this needs to be an ironclad rule, either. If there were to be some form of
written depiction that as a category of speech had little expressive value, then perhaps it
could be restricted for the worst crimes as well under the Ferber rationale.
148
See, e.g., Schooler, supra note 4.
149
See, e.g., id.; MURDERAUCTION.COM, http://www.murderauction.com/index.php (last
visited Oct. 17, 2011); SERIAL KILLERS INK,NET, http://serialkillersink.net/skistore/ (last
visited Oct. 17, 2011).
150
See supra INTRODUCTION.
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related‖ to crime; therefore it falls under Ferber and may be
restricted. The question, though, is whether its expressive value is
truly as low as child pornography just because it is an item and not
a depiction.
By analogy, cases interpreting the Lanham Act and the right to
publicity do not afford constitutional protection for works that
piggyback on another‘s notoriety unless the work uses the
subject‘s fame in a creative manner.151 For example, simply using
Rosa Parks‘ name in the title of a song is not protected by the First
Amendment unless it is a creative use, not one that simply hopes to
attract attention by mentioning her name.152 Perhaps a similar rule
could apply to murderabilia, i.e., that it is not protected under the
First Amendment unless it modifies or addresses the criminal‘s
notoriety in a creative way. Such a rule seems logical considering
that a celebrity‘s right to profit from his or her name—the right
that overcomes the First Amendment under the Lanham Act—
should not be weightier than the right of victims of heinous crimes
to be free from uncreative products that recall their suffering and
encourage more crime. Such a rule would allow governments to
regulate essentially all ―item murderabilia‖—artifacts with no
creative element whose value derives solely from their connection
to crime—since arguably none of it is creative.153
On the other hand, Ferber allows much stricter regulations than
the Lanham Act. Whereas the Lanham Act allows celebrities to
sue for profits wrongly obtained through the use of their names,154
Ferber and its progeny allow governments to outlaw certain kinds
of speech and subject possessors and distributors to criminal

151

Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451–52 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 461.
153
Another potential justification for restricting ―item murderabilia‖ is that it could
sometimes be pure commercial speech, which generally may be restricted more easily
than other kinds of speech, though commercial speech is not as unprotected as child
pornography. See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980). In any case, it might be difficult to determine when murderabilia is also
commercial speech.
154
Parks, 329 F.3d at 445.
152
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sanctions.155 While victims of crime might like this kind of rule, it
almost certainly goes too far. Would the victims themselves be
prohibited from possessing items related to a crime? Would they
have to destroy mementos of their lost loved ones? Would a
criminal released from jail have to knock down his own house
because a murder was committed there? Would the Newseum
have to close down its exhibit displaying Ted Kaczynski‘s cabin,
bomb, and handmade gun?156 Such examples highlight the fact
that murderabilia, because it is a broad category, involves more
instances of First Amendment expression than child pornography,
which means that any application of Ferber must be strictly
cabined.
Regarding ―item murderabilia,‖ therefore, I submit that the
eight states (plus the federal government) that have passed antiprofiting laws have found the correct line—namely, that
unexpressive, uncreative murderabilia cannot be banned
completely, but legislatures may restrict its sale.157 Drawing the
line at sales for profit would seem to comport with Ferber in that
selling such items encourages others to commit heinous crimes,
and continues to harm the victims by bringing up their bad
memories, but merely possessing or viewing such items is unlikely
to cause the same kind of harm.
Therefore, existing anti-profiting laws seem to strike the
correct balance with respect to ―item murderabilia.‖158 The anti155

See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
156
See Nelson & Prendergast, supra note 12, at 678–79.
157
See Hurley, supra note 6, at 417–23. Legislatures enacted anti-profiting laws for a
different reason, i.e., to get around Simon and ensure that their anti-murderabilia laws
were based on something other than the content of speech. Id. But this rationale involves
the inferential leap that ―profiting from crime‖ involves selling something only
tangentially related to that crime—for example, Richard Ramirez‘s shirt that he wore at
his trial, which is currently on sale for $1,400.00, arguably has nothing to do with
Ramirez‘s murders. MURDERAUCTION.COM, supra note 148. He simply wore it at his
trial, after the crimes were committed. And for this reason anti-profiting laws are still
open to criticism under the First Amendment and Simon, because the anti-profiting
rationale can seem like a weak subterfuge to get at the speech content of relatedness to
crime or criminals. But see Hurley, supra note 6, at 417–23.
158
Hurley, supra note 6, at 439.
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profiting rationale does not distinguish those statutes from Simon,
as some legislators may have hoped, but instead limits the
application of Ferber in this realm. In other words, Ferber
overrides Simon in certain categories of particularly harmful
speech, such as murderabilia, but in the category of ―item
murderabilia,‖ Ferber should apply only up to the point where
anti-profiting laws currently operate, i.e., restricting sales for
profit. In this way, Eric Gein, the founder of SerialKillersInk.net,
may be correct that ―item murderabilia‖ is speech under the First
Amendment, but he would still have to shut down his
auctioneering website, at least insofar as it sells the
murderabilia.159 This rule would also square with the notion that
the academic and historical justifications for websites that auction
murderabilia were always a thinly veiled excuse for profiteering,
not unlike the uncreative use of the title ―Rosa Parks‖ in a
commercially-marketed song.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that Ferber should extend to murderabilia
because its doctrinal language and underlying rationales apply. As
with child pornography, murderabilia is ―intrinsically related‖ to
crime, and allowing it to be restricted in certain circumstances has
the potential to help victims avoid continued harm and prevent
more crimes from being committed. Stevens clarified that Ferber
can be extended beyond child pornography, and the kinds of
murderabilia that I have identified in this article seem like a good
fit.
But none of this explains why extending Ferber is the best way
to address this problem. Forty states and the federal government
have decided that murderabilia is a problem worth addressing, but
they have not used Ferber to do it. Rather, in one way or another,
they have tried to get around Simon. In other words, legislatures
appear to have tried to restrict murderabilia by pretending that they
were not dealing with speech at all—as if by simply restricting
―profit‖ (anti-profiting laws) and ―commerce‖ (Senator Cornyn‘s

159

Kugiya, supra note 6.
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proposed bill), they can take the First Amendment problem off the
table.
I think the First Amendment prefers that lawmakers deal
directly with the constitutional issue. There is no shortage of
precedent to support the notion that the most harmful kinds of
speech can be restricted as speech under properly cabined statutes
that recite grave harm. Ferber, in my opinion, is not only the most
effective way of dealing with the problem of murderabilia, but also
the most honest. Ferber and its progeny forthrightly acknowledge
that some speech is so harmful that it can be restricted, and
because the cases acknowledge that they are restricting speech,
they make sure to limit the doctrine to the narrowest categories of
speech necessary to prevent grave harm.
Virtual child
pornography and depictions of animal cruelty, no matter how
distasteful, do not fit.
But some murderabilia should fit. As described above, snuff
films, depictions of rape, and some item murderabilia are so
harmful to victims, and so lacking in potential value as categories
of speech, that the First Amendment should not be concerned
about restricting them any more than it is concerned about
restricting child pornography. It is not always the case that where
doctrinal tests may be extended to new categories, it is wise to do
so, but this is one of those cases.

